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We use a general equilibrium model to address the question whether a regulatory
emission standard or an emission tax yields higher societal welfare for any given
target on aggregate emission. The key feature of the model is that the plants are
heterogeneous in productivity and monopolistically competitive in the production of
dirty-goods whose by-product is emission. We ﬁnd that the standard yields higher
welfare than the tax if and only if productivity dispersion is small and the monopoly
power in the dirty-goods sector is strong. Thus, productivity dispersion should be
important in the evaluation of market-based environmental policies relative to non-
market policies.
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01 Introduction
The economics of climate change has attracted increasing attention in academic and public
debates, especially after the publication of the Stern (2006) Review. There is wide dis-
agreement on how stringent the emission target should be in order for the world economy
to avoid a large loss that may be caused by climate change. In this paper, we address
ad i ﬀerent question: Given an emission target, is it more desirable to achieve it by im-
posing an emission tax or a (non-tradable) emission standard? The predominant view is
that market-based instruments, such as emission taxes and tradable emission quotas, are
more eﬃcient than nontradable regulatory standards. We show that the answer is far from
clear. In particular, we demonstrate that productivity dispersion in the economy and its
interaction with abatement choices are important factors determining whether an emission
tax or standard is more desirable for achieving an emission target.
Regulatory standards and market-based instruments are two common forms of environ-
mental policy. A regulatory standard speciﬁes the actions that a ﬁrm or individual must
undertake to achieve environmental objectives. Firms and individuals cannot meet such
a standard by trading with others in the market. In contrast, instruments like emission
taxes and tradable emission quotas work though the price system. Traditionally, most
environmental policies had been in the form of regulatory standards. Starting from the
1970s, however, opinions have shifted to favor market-based instruments. For example, the
Stern Review (part IV, p310) states that “a common price signal is needed across coun-
tries and sectors to ensure that emission reductions are delivered in the most cost-eﬀective
way...... [Both] taxes and tradable quotas have the potential to deliver emission reductions
eﬃciently.” Reﬂecting this assessment, the main debate on policy instruments has now
shifted onto which market instruments should be used and, in particular, onto the choice
between emission taxes and tradable emission quotas.
Our view is that this shift is premature.1 Most models that demonstrate the advantage
of market instruments relative to regulatory standards have omitted productivity dispersion
across ﬁrms or plants. There are good reasons why productivity dispersion should play a
central role in the evaluation of environmental policies. First, productivity dispersion
1Freeman and Kolstad (2007) documents the past twenty years of experience in using market-based
instruments, in comparison with command-and-control policies such as regulatory standards.
1has direct implications on an economy’s eﬃciency in production and, hence, on policy
evaluation (see more discussions below). Second, productivity dispersion has been shown
to be important for accounting for trade ﬂows and for explaining how trade policies aﬀect
ﬁrms’ trade decisions (e.g. Eaton and Kortum, 2002, and Melitz, 2003). It is natural to
expect that productivity dispersion can play a similarly important role in determining how
ﬁrms’ production and abatement choices respond to environmental policies.
To uncover the importance of productivity dispersion, we introduce emission and en-
vironmental policies into a model of monopolistic competition that shares some elements
with the Eaton-Kortum-Melitz model. There are two types of consumption goods: a clean
good and a dirty-goods composite. The composite aggregates a continuum of varieties that
are imperfect substitutes. Each variety is produced by one plant, and the sector of dirty
goods is monopolistically competitive. The plants are heterogeneous in productivity. The
production of a dirty good generates emission as a by-product, and aggregate emission re-
duces the households’ utility. A plant’s emission increases with its input and, hence, with
its output. However, a more productive plant has a lower emission intensity in the sense
that its emission-output ratio is lower. We consider two environmental policies. One is
an emission-intensity standard that requires a plant’s emission-output ratio not to exceed
a given level, and the other is an emission tax imposed on each unit of emission.2,3 As a
response to the policies, a plant can put resources into emission abatement.
Given any arbitrary target on the aggregate level of emission, we compare the equilibria
under the two policies. To isolate the role of productivity dispersion, we examine ﬁrst the
environment where the plants do not have access to an abatement technology and then
the environment where the plants have such access. In each environment, we determine
equilibrium quantities of goods produced and the aggregate level of abatement under each
of the two policies. We rank the two policies according to the representative household’s
intertemporal utility (i.e., the welfare function).
2The regulatory standard examined here is a performance standard instead of a technology standard
(see IPCC, 2007). A technology standard mandates speciﬁc pollution abatement technologies or production
methods, such as speciﬁcC O 2 capture and storage methods on a power plant. A performance standard
mandates speciﬁc environmental outcomes per unit of product (or input) such as a certain number of
grams of CO2 per kilowatt-hour of electricity generated.
3We do not examine tradable emission permits or quotas because they are equivalent to the emission
tax in our model. In fact, the price of such tradable permits is equal to the tax rate.
2In the presence of productivity dispersion, a critical diﬀerence between the tax and the
standard is in how they aﬀect the average productivity in the economy. The tax changes all
plants’ marginal costs by the same proportion since it is proportional to a plant’s emission.
As a result, the tax does not change the average productivity in the economy. In contrast,
the standard imposes a more stringent constraint on the plants with low productivity than
on the plants with high productivity, because high-productivity plants have a lower ratio
of emission to output which allows them to meet the standard more easily. This uneven
constraint induces productive resources to move from the plants with low productivity to
the plants with high productivity. A natural conjecture is that this movement increases the
average productivity in the economy, which enables the standard to achieve higher output
and welfare than the tax does.
Surprisingly, this conjecture is not supported in the model. Instead, the opposite is true
in the environment where the plants do not have access to an abatement technology. In
this environment, the tax induces higher average productivity in the economy and a higher
quantity of the dirty-goods composite than the standard does. In addition, more varieties
of the dirty goods are produced in the economy under the tax, while the same quantity of
the clean good is produced under the two policies. Thus, the tax is unambiguously better
than the standard in terms of welfare when there is no abatement. This surprising result
arises because the plants produce varieties that are not perfectly substitutable in the dirty-
goods composite. A high-productivity plant has higher output but contributes less at the
m a r g i nt ot h ed i r t y - g o o d sc o m p o s i t e ,b e c a u s et h em a r g i n a lc o n t r i b u t i o no ft h eo u t p u to f
each variety to the composite is diminishing. The average productivity in the economy is
a weighted sum of the plants’ productivity, where the weights for a plant are the variety’s
marginal contribution to the composite. This “value-weighted” marginal productivity must
be equalized across all operating plants, as productive resources are perfectly mobile across
the plants. When the standard induces resources to move from low-productivity plants
to high-productivity plants, it increases output and, hence, reduces the value-weighted
productivity in high-productivity plants. As a result, the average productivity is lower
under the standard than under the tax.
Introducing an abatement technology changes the results signiﬁcantly. In particular,
when there is no productivity dispersion among the plants, the abatement technology
3enables the standard to induce a higher quantity of the dirty-goods composite and a lower
quantity of the clean good than the tax does. When the monopoly power of each variety
is suﬃciently strong in the sense that the elasticity of substitution between the varieties is
suﬃciently low, the quantity of the dirty-goods composite is suﬃciently higher under the
standard than under the tax. In this case, the standard yields higher welfare than the tax.
More generally, the standard induces a higher quantity of the dirty-goods composite and
higher welfare than the tax if and only if productivity dispersion is suﬃciently small and
the monopoly power of each variety is suﬃciently strong.
The reason why the abatement technology enables the standard to yield higher welfare
than the tax is not that it reverses the ranking in the average productivity between the
two policies; in fact, the tax still induces higher average productivity than the standard
does. Rather, the reason is that with the abatement technology (and when productivity
dispersion is small), the standard creates less upward pressure on the price index of the
dirty-goods composite than the tax does which, in turn, induces higher demand for and
higher output of the dirty goods. We will explain the underlying mechanism in subsection
4.3. There, we will also explain how the abatement choice interacts with productivity
dispersion diﬀerently under the two policies.
As mentioned earlier, our model has similar elements to the recent trade literature
that emphasizes productivity dispersion among plants, e.g., Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Melitz (2003). But our model is not a trade model - it has only one country. Environmental
issues are clearly diﬀerent from trade issues. Even when tariﬀs and quotas are introduced
into the Eaton-Kortum-Melitz model, the analysis will diﬀer signiﬁcantly from ours. First,
emission generates a negative externality to the society which does not have an apparent
counterpart in the trade literature. Second, emission is a by-product of a ﬁrm’s production
process. An emission policy is imposed on this by-product rather than on the regular goods
as are tariﬀs and trade quotas. Third, the producers can use an abatement technology to
reduce emission without aﬀecting the output of the regular goods, and diﬀerent environ-
mental policies aﬀect the abatement choice diﬀerently. With all these diﬀerences, it can
be misleading to compare our results with those in the trade literature on tariﬀsv e r s u s
quotas (e.g., Young and Anderson, 1980).
More closely related to our paper are the applications to environmental issues of the
4price-versus-quantity literature originated from the seminal paper of Weitzman (1974).4
See, for example, Pizer (2002), Hepburn (2006) and Mandell (2008). This literature ad-
dresses the question whether it is more desirable to control the price or the quantity of
emission. The main result is that the answer depends on the slope of and the uncertainty
in the marginal-cost curve of abatement relative to the marginal-beneﬁt curve of emission
reduction. If the marginal-cost curve is steeper than the marginal-beneﬁtc u r v ea n di s
exposed to higher uncertainty, then it is more beneﬁcial to control the price of emission
and let the quantity of emission vary to reﬂe c tt h el a r g es h i f ti nt h em a r g i n a lc o s t . O n
the other hand, if the marginal-beneﬁt curve is steeper and exposed to higher uncertainty,
then it is more beneﬁcial to control the quantity and let the price vary to reﬂect the large
shift in the beneﬁtc u r v e .
The main issue in our paper is not price-versus-quantity. For both the tax and the
standard, we ﬁx the total quantity of emission at any arbitrary target. Moreover, the
price-versus-quantity literature evaluates one group of market instruments (price instru-
ments) against another group of market instruments (e.g., tradable quotas). In contrast, we
evaluate a market instrument (the tax) against a nontradable instrument (the standard).
Finally, the main player in our model is diﬀerent from that in the price-versus-quantity
literature. While uncertainty is the main character in this literature, we abstract from
aggregate uncertainty and focus, instead, on productivity dispersion among the plants and
its interaction with abatement choices.
We also abstract from many other factors that may be important for evaluating the
relative merit of an emission tax and a standard. Examples of these factors include emission
monitoring when producers have private information (see Montero, 2005) and practical
diﬃculties in implementing an environmental policy (see Stern, 2006). Such abstraction
is intended to focus on productivity dispersion, whose role is not well understood in the
literature in the evaluation of environmental policies.
4We do not survey this literature here. For some examples, see Laﬀont (1977) for incorporating subjec-
tive uncertainty, Yohe (1978) for examining additional sources of uncertainty and informational diﬃculty
within a regulated heirarchy, and Kelly (2005) for a general-equilibrium framework.
52 The Model Environment
Consider a one-period economy that is populated by a unit measure of households. Each
household is endowed with one unit of resource that can be supplied as the input in
productive plants and receives dividends from a diversiﬁed portfolio of the plants. A
household’s utility function is u(c,Q,M),w h e r ec is consumption of a clean good, Q
consumption of a composite of the dirty-goods varieties, and M the aggregate level of
emission per household. Deﬁne the marginal rate of substitution between the dirty-goods





where the subscripts of u indicate partial derivatives.
Assumption 1 (i) u1 > 0, u2 > 0, u11 < 0 and u22 < 0; (ii) u3 < 0; (iii) R3(c,Q,M) ≤ 0.
Part (i) of the assumption is standard. Part (ii) says that emission generates a negative
externality on households. Part (iii) says that emission (weakly) increases a household’s
desire for the clean good relative to the dirty goods.
The clean good is homogeneous and its production does not generate emission. The
technology for producing the clean good is wlc,w h e r elc is the input and w>0 is a
constant. For the sake of simplicity, we lump all types of inputs into one so that the
production function is linear in this input. There is perfect competition in the clean-good
sector, and so the price of the resource in terms of the clean good is equal to the constant
w. Throughout this paper, we will use the clean good as the numeraire.5
The dirty goods have varieties in a continuum, [0,1]. Each variety is produced by
at most one plant, and the dirty-goods sector is monopolistically competitive. At the
beginning of the period, all plants are identical. A plant can choose at most one variety
to produce. After the choice, the plant draws a productivity level x from the distribution
(cdf) G(.),w i t has u p p o r t[x,∞). We will refer to a plant with productivity x as plant
x.N o t et h a td i ﬀe r e n tp l a n t st h a td r a wt h es a m ex produce diﬀerent varieties. After the
5Including the clean good in the model is convenient because we can model all ﬁxed costs and taxes in
terms of the clean good, thereby simplifying the accounting in the model.
6realization of x, a plant can choose whether or not to operate. As we will see, whether a
plant chooses to be operative can depend on the environmental policy in place and, hence,
the set of dirty goods produced in the economy may or may not be the same as the interval
[0,1].I fp l a n tx operates, its output is
q(x)=e
xl(x),
where l(x) i st h ep l a n t ’ si n p u t .B e c a u s et h ep l a n ti st h eo n l yo n et h a tp r o d u c e st h ev a r i e t y ,
it does not take the price of the variety as given; instead, it takes as given the demand
c u r v ef o rt h ev a r i e t y .









,ε > 1,( 1 )
where qi i st h ea m o u n to fc o n s u m p t i o no fv a r i e t yi, the set I contains all the varieties of
the dirty goods produced in the period, and ε is the elasticity of substitution between the
varieties. The assumption ε>1 is standard in the literature.
P r o d u c t i o no fad i r t yg o o dg e n e r a t e se m i s s i o na sab y - p r o d u c t .I nt h eb a s e l i n em o d e l ,
the amount of emission of plant x obeys the following “emission process”:
m(x)=bl (x),b > 0.( 2 )
In an extended model, we will introduce an abatement technology which a plant can use
to reduce emission. Let us express the level of abatement, a, in terms of the input so that
t h ec o s to ft h ea b a t e m e n ti swa. By choosing a level of abatement, a(x),ap l a n tx can








, γ>0.( 3 )
The eﬀectiveness of the abatement technology can be measured by 1/γ. In the limit γ → 0,
even a tiny amount of abatement can eliminate the plant’s emission; in the opposite limit
γ →∞ , abatement does not reduce emission.
This emission process captures two general and realistic features. First, in the absence
of abatement (i.e., when a(x)=0 ), a high-x plant has a lower emission-output ratio,
7m(x)/q(x),t h a nal o w - x plant although a high-x plant has a higher level of emission due to
its higher output. The use of this feature will become apparent below when we describe the
environmental policies. Second, the emission-input ratio, m(x)/l(x), is strictly decreasing
and convex in abatement. The decreasing feature is necessary for abatement to be useful,
and convexity ensures that a plant’s optimal level of abatement is unique. Although our
main results can continue to hold with more general emission processes that have these
features, the simple form above maintains tractability.6
We evaluate two environmental policies: (i) an emission tax τ that requires a plant to
pay τ (in terms of the clean good) for every unit of emission, and (ii) an emission standard
s that requires a plant’s emission-output ratio not to exceed s. The revenue from the
tax is rebated to the households through lump-sum transfers.7 Note that the emission
standard is on a plant’s emission-output ratio, rather than on the plant’s level of emission.
This speciﬁcation makes sense when the plants are heterogeneous in productivity. If an
emission standard requires a plant’s emission not to exceed a certain level, instead, then
a more productive plant will be more constrained by the standard than a less productive
plant is. Similarly, the presence of heterogeneous productivity is the reason why we assume
that a plant’s emission-output ratio is a decreasing function of x.I f a p l a n t ’ s e m i s s i o n -
output ratio is an increasing function of the plant’s productivity, instead, then an emission
standard puts an upper bound on the productivity level below which a plant can operate.
Since an emission standard in this case prevents more productive plants from operating, it
does not seem to be a good policy.
Another commonly debated policy is one that requires a plant to obtain an emission
permit for each unit of emission. We do not examine this policy separately here because
it is equivalent to the tax in our model, as stated below:
Remark 2 When an emission permit is tradable in a competitive market, it is equivalent
to an emission tax, with the price of the permit being equal to the tax rate.
Moreover, an emission standard can be interpreted as a nontradable emission permit
that is granted free to the plants whose emission-output ratio does not exceed the constant
6For example, as an alternative to (2), one can consider the speciﬁcation m(x)=m0q(x)+b[q(x)]
ψ,
where m0 > 0, b>0 and ψ ∈ (0,1).
7This assumption eliminates the need for government revenue as a potential diﬀerence between the tax
and the standard. See Stern (2006, Part IV) for more discussions on this diﬀerence.
8s. Thus, an emission tax diﬀers from an emission standard in two ways. One is that the
tax is a market instrument but the standard is nontradable. The other is that the tax
directly aﬀects a plant’s marginal cost of production, but the standard aﬀects the marginal
cost only indirectly through the abatement choice and/or equilibrium eﬀects.8
Note that uncertainty does not play an important role in this model. Although each
individual plant’s productivity is random, this random variable is realized before the plant
makes the decisions. More importantly, there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy,
because there is a continuum of plants. Speciﬁcally, the supply curve of the dirty-goods
composite, total input, total abatement, and total emission are all deterministic in this
model. As said in the introduction, this abstraction from uncertainty sharpens our focus
on the role of productivity dispersion in the evaluation of environmental policies.
3 Equilibrium and Policies without Abatement
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and evaluate the two policies when an
abatement technology does not exist, i.e., when the emission process obeys (2). The
purpose is to isolate the role of productivity dispersion in policy evaluation. Section 4
will incorporate an abatement technology. In the current section, we unify the notation
under the two policies by characterizing the equilibrium when both policies are present.
3.1 Household’s decisions
A household chooses consumption of the clean good, c, and consumption of the dirty
goods, (qi)i∈I, to maximize utility. It is convenient to index a dirty good by the plant’s
productivity level, x, rather than the index i. For each plant with a particular x,l e tl(x)
be its input, q(x) its output, p(x) the price of its product and m(x) its emission. Because
each plant’s productivity is drawn randomly according to the distribution G, the density of
plants with any particular x is G0(x).9 Let X be the set of productivity levels of operative
8Another policy is to issue a production permit (license) that is necessary for a plant to produce dirty
goods and that is sold in the market at a competitive price. In contrast to an emission tax or standard, such
production permits do not directly restrict a plant’s emission, because a plant that obtains a production
permit can produce as much as desirable. For this reason, a production permit cannot aﬀect a plant’s
choice of the abatement technology.
9It is important to bear in mind that even if two plants draw the same x, they necessarily produce
diﬀerent varieties. The quantity q(x) is not total output of all plants that draw the same x, but rather the



















Here, π(x) is the dividend from plant x and T the lump-sum transfer from the government.
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Consider a plant x in the dirty-goods sector that chooses to produce. The plant’s proﬁti s :
π(x)=p(x)q(x) − wl(x) − τm(x).
The plant faces the demand curve for its product, given by (5). It chooses the input,
l(x),t om a x i m i z ep r o ﬁt, taking as given the industry demand Q and the price index P.
Substituting p(x) from (5), q(x) from the production function, and m(x) from (2), we can






ε − (w + τb)l(x).








output of each of these plants. The same clariﬁcation applies to l(x) and m(x).
10The plant’s output is q(x)=exl(x) and its emission is m(x)=bl(x). We can calculate






The term (w+τb)e−x is the plant’s marginal cost adjusted for the plant’s productivity and
the emission tax, which we will refer to as the plant’s eﬀective marginal cost. The above
result reveals that the price of a plant’s product is a constant markup 1
ε−1 of the plant’s










.( 1 0 )
A plant’s decision on whether to operate follows a cutoﬀ rule on productivity; that is,
ap l a n t - x operates if and only if x ≥ x0.T h e c u t o ﬀ x0 depends on the policy. Under
the emission tax, since π(x) > 0 for all x, all plants choose to operate and so x0 = x.
Under the emission standard, a plant x can operate only if s ≥ m(x)/q(x)=be−x.T h a t
is, x0 =l n ( b/s) under the emission standard. We summarize these two cases as
x0 =
½
ln(b/s), with the emission standard
x, without the tax. (11)
The set of productivity levels observed in the economy is X =[ x0,∞).
3.3 Aggregation and equilibrium
Let us denote total input in the production of dirty goods as L =
R ∞
x0 l(x)dG(x) and
the average productivity in the dirty-goods sector as φ = Q/L. Substituting l(x) from
(8) to compute L and q(x)=exl(x) into (4) to compute Q, we can express the average








.( 1 2 )
T h ea v e r a g eo ft h ep l a n t s ’e ﬀective marginal costs of production is (w+τb)/φ. Substituting
( 9 )i n t o( 7 )r e v e a l st h a tt h ep r i c el e v e lo ft h ed i r t y - g o o d sc o m p o s i t ei sac o n s t a n tm a r k u p







).( 1 3 )
11Let us refer to (τ,s, ¯ M,T) as the policies, where ¯ M is the target level of aggregate
emission. An equilibrium under the policies (τ,s, ¯ M,T) consists of the set X =[ x0,∞),t h e
functions (l(x),q(x),p(x))x∈X, the aggregate levels (c,Q,P,L,M) that satisfy the following
requirements: (i) Given the functions (p(x))x∈X, a household’s demand for the clean good,
c, and the demand for each dirty good, q(x), satisfy (5) and (6); (ii) Given (P,Q) and
the demand function (5), a plant operates if and only if x ≥ x0,w h e r ex0 satisﬁes (11),
and if a plant operates, its choices of input and output satisfy (8) and q(x)=exl(x); (iii)
The levels of (P,L,M) satisfy (13), L = Q/φ and M = bL,w h e r eφ is given by (12); (iv)
The resource market clears, i.e., lc =1− L; (v) The market of the clean good clears, i.e.,
c = wlc,a n dt h em a r k e t so ft h ed i r t yg o o d sc l e a r ;( v i )T h ep o l i c yτ or s ensures aggregate
emission not to exceed the target ¯ M, i.e., M ≤ ¯ M,a n dt h et r a n s f e rT satisﬁes T = τM
under the tax and T =0under the standard.
We examine the non-trivial case where the emission target ¯ M is binding, i.e., where
the economy would produce M> ¯ M if there were no policy. In this case, M = ¯ M in the
equilibrium. An equilibrium can be determined as follows. Part (iii) above gives L = ¯ M/b,
Q = φ ¯ M/b and P = P(τ,φ), while parts (iv) and (v) give c = w(1 −
¯ M
b ). With these











= P(τ,φ),( 1 4 )
where φ = φ(x0). Equation (14) determines the policy level that is needed to implement
the emission target ¯ M. Note that the emission standard enters the above equation through
φ(x0),b e c a u s ex0 is a function of s. For any emission target ¯ M,l e tτ( ¯ M) denote the tax,
and s( ¯ M) the standard, that achieves the target.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the abatement technology does not exist. Assume that [QR(c,Q,M)]
is a strictly increasing function of Q for any given (c,M) and that limQ→0 (QR)=0 .T h e












Given any binding target ¯ M, there is a unique equilibrium under each policy. Moreover,
τ0( ¯ M) < 0 and s0( ¯ M) > 0.
12The proof of this lemma appears in Appendix A. In addition to existence and unique-
ness of an equilibrium, the lemma states the intuitive feature that the tax can be lower
and the standard can be looser when the emission target is higher.
3.4 Comparison between the two policies
Let us add the subscript τ to (x0,L,P,Q,φ,u) under the tax and the subscript s to the
variables under the standard. The following proposition compares the equilibrium under
the tax with the equilibrium under the standard (see Appendix A for a proof):
Proposition 4 Assume that an abatement technology does not exist. Given any binding
emission target ¯ M, the following results hold: (i) Lτ = Ls and cτ = cs; (ii) x0τ <x 0s,
Qτ >Q s, φτ >φ s and Pτ <P s; (iii) uτ >u s.
Result (i) is not surprising. Since a plant’s emission is proportional to the plant’s
input, total emission is proportional to total input in the dirty-goods sector. Given the
same emission target, the emission process (2) implies that total input in the dirty-goods
sector must be the same under the two policies. As a result, total input in the clean-
good sector and, hence, consumption of the clean good must also be the same under the
two policies. Result (ii) states that, relative to the standard, the tax induces a larger set
of varieties of the dirty goods to be produced, a higher level of consumption of the dirty-
goods composite, a higher average level of productivity and a lower price of the dirty-goods
composite. We will explain this result below. Since the tax generates higher consumption
of the dirty-goods composite and the same level of consumption of the clean good, the tax
dominates the standard in welfare, as stated in Result (iii).
The outcome x0τ <x 0s in Result (ii) means that more varieties of the dirty goods are
produced under the tax than under the standard. This outcome arises from the diﬀerence
in how the two policies aﬀect a plant’s marginal cost and emission. The tax increases every
plant’s eﬀective marginal cost of production, thereby reducing every plant’s input, output
and emission. However, since each plant charges a price that is a constant markup over
the eﬀective marginal cost, the increase in the marginal cost does not eliminate the plant’s
proﬁt. Instead, all plants continue to operate with positive proﬁt under the tax — they
simply reduce the input and output. In contrast, the standard does not aﬀect a plant’s
13eﬀective marginal cost and emission. To meet the emission target at the aggregate level,
some plants must shut down, and these are the plants with low levels of x. As a result,
fewer varieties are produced under the standard than under the tax.
The two policies have diﬀerent eﬀects on the average productivity. The tax does not
change the average productivity, which is clear from (12). Put diﬀerently, the tax reduces
total input in the dirty-goods sector and output of the dirty-goods composite in the same
proportion. In contrast, the standard shuts down low-x plants. Because total input in the
dirty-goods sector is the same under the two policies (for any given emission target), the
input that is released from low-x plants is shifted to high-x plants. A priori, one would
guess that this shift should increase the average productivity. Surprisingly, the opposite is
t r u e ,a s( 1 2 )c l e a r l ys h o w st h a tt h ea v e r a g ep r o d u c t i v i t yf a l l sa sx0 increases.
How can it be the case that shutting down low-x plants and moving the input from
these plants to high-x plants reduces the average productivity? The key to answering this
question is the fact that diﬀerent varieties of the dirty goods are not perfect substitutes in
the composite, Q. Measured in terms of the contribution to Q, the marginal productivity
of the input is the same for all x. To verify this statement, note that the sum of the input















The ﬁrst equality follows from (4), the second from (5) and (9), and the last from (13).
The driving force for such equalization of the “value-weighted” marginal productivity is
perfect mobility of the resource across the plants. Although a low-x variety has a lower
productivity than a high-x variety, a smaller amount of a low-x variety is produced. Since
consumers value all varieties and the marginal utility of a variety is diminishing, a low-
x variety generates a higher marginal utility (and hence a higher price) than a high-x
variety. More precisely, in terms of the contribution to Q,p r o d u c t i v i t yex is weighted by
[q(x)/Q]−1/ε.A l o w - x variety has a lower relative quantity q(x)/Q in the composite and
hence a larger weight than a high-x variety. Weighted by this marginal utility, productivity
i st h es a m ei na l lv a r i e t i e s .
When low-x plants shut down under the emission standard and the resource is re-
allocated to high-x plants, output of the remaining plants increases. This higher quantity
14reduces the marginal contribution of each remaining variety to Q because such marginal
contribution is diminishing. In the new equilibrium, the marginal contribution of the input
is equalized at a lower level across the remaining plants. We can see this loss clearly by












As the marginal productivity of each remaining variety (i.e., the right-hand side) falls, so
does the average productivity.
Now it is easy to understand the results Pτ <P s and Qτ >Q s. The price level is
a constant markup of the average eﬀective marginal cost, (w + τb)/φ.S i n c e t h e a v e r a g e
productivity is higher under the tax than under the standard, the average eﬀective mar-
ginal cost is lower and, hence, the price level is lower under the tax. Moreover, higher
productivity under the tax directly translates into higher output of the composite, because
total input in the dirty-goods sector is the same under the two policies.
Note that productivity dispersion is necessary for a non-trivial comparison between the
two policies in this model. If there is no dispersion in productivity across the plants, then
all plants have to shut down under a binding standard while all plants continue to operate
under the tax. In this case, the tax is evidently better than the standard. Introducing the
abatement choice can avoid this trivial comparison, as shown in the next section.
Finally, let us make a remark on the optimal policy. Because emission generates a
negative externality on the households, there might be a trade-oﬀ between the emission
target, ¯ M, and consumption, Q. In this case, the optimal emission target is determinate.
For whatever target that is optimal under the standard, there exists a tax rate that achieves
the same target and higher welfare than the standard (see Proposition 4). Thus, welfare is
higher under the tax than under the standard even when the emission target is set to the
optimal level under each policy.
4 Equilibrium and Policy Analysis with Abatement
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and evaluate the two environmental policies
when the plants has access to the abatement technology (3). We demonstrate that the
15emission standard can sometimes achieve higher welfare than the tax by aﬀecting the
plants’ abatement choice diﬀerently from the tax. The analysis also uncovers how the
relative advantage of the two policies depends on several key features of the economy such
as productivity dispersion, the elasticity of substitution between the varieties of the dirty
g o o d sa n dt h ee ﬀectiveness of abatement.
4.1 Equilibrium characterization under each policy
A household’s decisions are the same as those in subsection 3.1. A plant’s decisions need
to be modiﬁed. Consider the tax ﬁrst. With the input into production, l(x), and the input














where we have substituted the demand function for the plant’s product, (5), and the
emission process, (3). The plant chooses the abatement level, a(x), and the input, l(x),t o
















,( 1 7 )
where






.( 1 8 )
By comparing (17) with its counterpart without the abatement choice, (8), we can
interpret the constant k as the plant’s marginal cost of production which incorporates the
price of the input, the marginal cost of abatement and the tax on emission. The optimal
















l(x).( 1 9 )
10To avoid unnecessary complications, we allow the choice a to be negative as well as positive, provided
1+a
l ≥ 0. The interpretation of a choice a<0 is that the plant uses a production technology that
produces more emission than the production technology in the baseline model.
16As in the baseline model, the price of a plant’s product is a constant markup over the
plant’s eﬀective marginal cost of production, which is ke−x in the current environment.
Moreover, π(x) > 0 for all x, and so all plants operate under the tax. That is, the set of
productivity levels observed in the economy is X =[ x,∞).






ε − wl(x) − wa(x).
The plant must meet the emission standard, i.e., m(x)/q(x) ≤ s.W i t h t h e e m i s s i o n
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, m(x)=sq(x).( 2 3 )




¢γ e−γx, which includes the






In contrast to the model without abatement, the model with abatement implies that
every plant meets the standard. To meet the standard, a plant can spend enough in
abatement and cut production suﬃciently. Since all varieties are produced under both
policies, we will omit the notation for the interval over which the integrals are computed
in this section, which is [x,∞).
We can compute the aggregate input in production, L, and the average productivity,
φ, similarly to the baseline model. Also, compute the aggregate level of abatement as
A =
R
a(x)dG(x). An equilibrium can be deﬁned by incorporating abatement into the
equilibrium deﬁnition in the baseline model. The following lemma determines the equilib-
rium (see Appendix B for a proof):
17Lemma 5 Assume that the abatement technology (3) is available. Under either policy,
there is a unique equilibrium, where L = Q/φ and Q is determined by (6). Under the
emission tax, φ = φ(x), where the function φ(.) is given by (12), and other aggregate















































































4.2 Comparing the two policies
With the abatement choice, aggregate quantities depend on the distribution of productivity
i nac o m p l i c a t e dw a ya ss h o w ni nL e m m a5 .T og a i ni n s i g h t si n t ot h em o d e l ,l e tu sa s s u m e
as p e c i ﬁc distribution function of x and a speciﬁc utility function in this subsection. We
will consider more general forms of these functions in section 5. The speciﬁc distribution
function (cdf) of x is exponential:
G(x)=1− e
−(x−x)/δ, δ ∈ (0,¯ δ),( 3 0 )
where ¯ δ =m i n {1
2, 1
ε(γ+1)}. This distribution implies that productivity z = ex is distributed




¢1/δ. The restriction δ<1/[ε(γ +1)]
is required for λ to be ﬁnite, while the restriction δ<1/2 is required for the variance of
ex to be ﬁnite. Under the restriction δ<1/2,t h em e a no fex is ex
1−δ and the variance is
18δ2e2x
(1−2δ)(1−δ)2.I fw eﬁx the mean of ex at any arbitrary level ¯ z>0 by setting x =l n [ ( 1−δ)¯ z],
then the variance of ex is
(δ¯ z)2
1−2δ. Since this variance is increasing in δ,w er e f e rt oδ as the
dispersion of productivity among the plants.
The utility function is assumed as
u(c,Q,M)=U(c + v(M)Q),w i t hU
0 > 0, U
00 < 0, v>0, v
0 < 0.( 3 1 )
With this utility function, the marginal rate of substitution between the dirty-goods com-
posite and the clean good is u2/u1 = v(M). For any given emission target M, the equilib-
rium price of the dirty-goods composite is a constant P = v(M).W i t h( 3 1 ) ,w ec a ns o l v e






















, with the standard.
(32)
For any given emission target, the equilibrium value of Q diﬀers under the two policies in
two aspects. One is the diﬀerence in the average productivity. The other is that there is a
constant (γ +1)under the tax, while the corresponding constant is λ under the standard.
Add the subscript τ to the variables under the tax and the subscript s to the variables
under the standard. The following proposition contains the central results of the paper
(see Appendix C for a proof):
Proposition 6 Assume that the abatement technology is available as described by (3) and

















τ; (ii) If ε ≥ ε0,t h e nus <u τ for all δ and, if ε<ε 0, then there ex-
ists δ0 ∈ (0,¯ δ) such that us >u τ iﬀ δ<δ 0; (iii) us >u τ =⇒ Qs >Q τ =⇒ Ls >L τ =⇒
As >A τ,a n dLs >L τ =⇒ cs <c τ; (iv) The emission target that maximizes utility is the
same under the two policies and is given by M∗ =a r gm a xM [v(M)]
(1+γ)/γ.
The abatement choice does not change the ranking of the two policies in the average
productivity. Measured as φ, the average productivity is still higher under the tax than
19under the standard. Although this diﬀerence is similar to that in the baseline model where
abatement is not available, the mechanism is not as extreme as in the baseline model.
Rather than forcing low-x plants to shut down as in the baseline model, the standard only
reduces low-x plants’ input and shifts it to high-x plants. To see why this shift occurs, note
that in order to meet the emission standard, a low-x plant must spend more in abatement
in proportion to its production. That is, the ratio of the input in abatement to production,
a(x)/l(x), is a decreasing function of x under the standard. A high-x plant employes more
resources in production than a low-x plant, above and beyond what the diﬀerence in x
alone calls for. Because the marginal contribution of each variety to the composite Q is
diminishing, this shift of the input from low-output plants to high-output plants reduces
the average contribution of the input to the composite. In contrast, the tax does not
induce this shift of the input because the ratio of abatement to the input in production is
constant across the plants under the tax. Thus, the average productivity is lower under
the standard. Note that this result does not rely on the particular utility function (31).
The measure φ counts only the input in production of the dirty goods but not the
input in abatement. Since total input in the dirty-goods sector is (L + A),t h ee ﬀective
productivity in the dirty-goods sector is Q/(L + A). Part (i) of Proposition 7 says that,
when the utility function has the form in (31), the eﬀective productivity is also higher
under the tax than under the standard.11
The abatement choice signiﬁcantly modiﬁes the ranking of the two policies in other
aspects, including the ranking in welfare. Part (ii) of Proposition 7 says that the standard
can yield higher welfare than the tax, which is not possible in the baseline model where the
abatement choice is not available. Speciﬁcally, the standard yields higher welfare than the
tax if productivity dispersion is suﬃciently small and if the monopoly power of each variety
is suﬃciently strong in the sense that ε is small. Part (iii) provides a list of comparisons
between the two policies. In particular, for the standard to yield higher welfare than the
tax, the standard must induce a higher level of the dirty-goods composite, a higher input
into production of dirty goods, a higher level of abatement, and lower consumption of the
clean good. Part (iv) says that the optimal emission target is the same under the two
policies. An implication is that the same ranking described in parts (i) - (iii) is valid if the
11As in the baseline model, one can compute the eﬀective marginal productivity of the input in each
plant x as 1
G0(x)∂Q/∂[l(x)+a(x)] a n dv e r i f yt h a ti ti se q u a lt oQ/(L + A).
20emission target is chosen optimally under each policy.
4.3 Why is the standard possibly better than the tax?
To answer this question, we examine ﬁrst how the abatement choice changes the equilibrium
when there is no dispersion in productivity and then how the abatement choice interacts
with productivity dispersion.
4.3.1 The case with no dispersion in productivity
C o n s i d e ra ne c o n o m yw i t hn od i s p e r s i o ni np r o d u c t i v i t ya n dl e tx be the level of produc-
tivity of all plants. In this economy, allowing for the abatement choice is necessary for the
comparison between the two policies to be non-trivial. If abatement is not available in this
economy, then a binding standard induces all plants to shut down and, hence, it is clearly
inferior to the tax. With the abatement choice in this economy, the two policies are ranked
as in the following proposition (see Appendix B for a proof):
Proposition 7 When there is no productivity dispersion, the equilibrium with the abate-
ment choice yields φs = φτ, λ =1 , Qs >Q τ, Ls >L τ, As >A τ and cs <c τ for any given
emission target M. Moreover, a suﬃcient condition for us >u τ is ε ≤ 1+1
γ. On the other
hand, if ε is suﬃciently large, then us <u τ.
The abatement choice enables all plants to operate under the standard, thus eliminating
a main disadvantage of the standard relative to the tax. When there is no dispersion in
productivity, the average productivity is clearly the same under both policies. Moreover,
the standard induces higher input in and output of the dirty-goods production, and higher
abatement. If the monopoly power of each variety is suﬃciently strong in the sense that ε is
small, then the standard generates higher welfare than the tax. Therefore, the abatement
choice signiﬁcantly alters the welfare ranking between the two policies.12
The standard can generate higher welfare than the tax because with abatement and
homogeneous productivity, the standard creates less upward pressure on the price level of
the dirty-goods composite than the tax does. We will explain this result below. Given
this result on the price, it is clear that the household wants to consume more dirty goods
12Note that the results in Proposition 7 hold for general utility functions, not just for that in (31).
21and less clean good under the standard than under the tax. To satisfy the demand, more
resource is employed in the production of the dirty goods under the standard. Since higher
output of the dirty goods generates higher emission, abatement is also higher under the
standard in order for the dirty-goods sector to meet the standard. Since total input in the
dirty-goods sector is higher under the standard, the input and output in the clean-good
sector are lower than under the tax. The welfare ranking between the two policies depends
on the relative change in the two types of consumption. When the monopoly power in the
dirty-goods sector is suﬃciently strong, the markup of price on the marginal cost is high,
and a small diﬀerence in the marginal cost can translate into a large diﬀerence in price.
In this case, the increase in the dirty-goods composite under the standard relative to the
tax is suﬃciently large to outweigh the decrease in the clean good, and so the standard
induces higher utility than the tax.
We now explain how the two policies aﬀect the price. When there is no dispersion in
productivity, the price index of the dirty-goods composite mimics each individual plant’s
eﬀective marginal cost of the input in production, as the former is a constant markup of the
latter. The eﬀective marginal cost of the input in production consists of the direct and the
indirect cost. The direct marginal cost is the price of the input, which is the same (w)u n d e r
the two policies. The indirect cost occurs in diﬀerent places under the two policies. Under
the standard, the indirect cost occurs through abatement. Because the plant’s optimal
choice of abatement is such that a plant just meets the standard, this choice depends on
the input in production. By increasing emission, a higher input in production calls for an
increase in abatement in order to meet the standard, which increases the eﬀective marginal
cost of production. Under the tax, in contrast, the indirect cost comes from the tax on
emission: by increasing emission, an increase in the input in production increases the tax
payment.13 The indirect cost is lower under the standard than under the tax because
for any given level of emission m(x), an increase in the input l(x) has the mitigating
eﬀect of relaxing the constraint imposed by the standard, m(x) ≤ sl (x).T h u s , f o r t h e
same emission level and the same input in production, a plant’s eﬀective marginal cost of
13A higher input in production also induces higher abatement. However, this increase in abatement
does not increase the marginal cost of the plant under the tax, in contrast to the case under the standard.
The reason is that higher abatement also reduces emission and, hence, lowers the tax payment. When the
level of abatement is chosen optimally, these two eﬀects of a higher input in production on the eﬀective
marginal cost through abatement cancel out — an implication of the envelope theorem.
22production is lower and the upward pressure on the price of the dirty-goods composite is
lower under the standard than under the tax.
To support the above explanation, recall that a plant’s eﬀective marginal cost of pro-
duction is w(γ+1)( τb
γw)
γ




¢γ e−(γ+1)x under the standard. When
there is no dispersion in productivity, each plant’s input, abatement, and emission are equal
to their industry average. That is, l(x)=L, a(x)=A and m(x)=M.F r o mt h ee q u a t i o n
m(x)=M, we can solve the policy level (s or τ) that is required to meet the target M.
With this policy level, the eﬀective marginal cost of production is w(γ +1)(bL
M)γe−x under
the tax and w(bL
M)γe−x under the standard. Clearly, the former is higher than the latter
by a factor (γ +1). Since the price level is ε/(ε−1) times the eﬀective marginal cost, it is
also higher under the tax than under the standard by a factor (γ +1 ) .14
4.3.2 The interaction between productivity dispersion and abatement
We have explained that with homogeneous plants, the standard creates less upward pressure
on the price index of the dirty-goods composite. Productivity dispersion changes this result
by increasing the upward pressure on the price index exerted by the standard. First of
all, with productivity dispersion, the average productivity in the dirty-goods sector is
lower under the standard than under the tax, as we explained earlier. A lower average
productivity adds upward pressure on the price. Moreover, the standard induces such
abatement choices that push up the marginal cost by more at plants with high prices than
at plants with low prices. This change in the distribution of relative prices also adds upward
pressure on the price index under the standard, and is reﬂected by the factor λ>1 in the
pricing formula under the standard, (27).
Let us explain why the standard induces abatement choices that change the distribution
of relative prices, but the tax does not. In order to meet the standard, low-x plants
must spend a higher proportion of their resources in abatement relative to their input in
production than high-x plants do (see the explanation immediately after Proposition 6).
Thus, the standard increases low-x plants’ marginal costs and prices by more than high-
x plants’. Under monopolistic competition, low-x plants produce less and charge higher
14It can be veriﬁed that, with homogeneous productivity, the eﬀective marginal cost of production is
higher under the tax than under the standard even for a general emission process, m(x)=μ(l(x),a(x)),
where μ1 > 0 and μ2 < 0.
23prices than high-x plants do even when the standard is not imposed. Imposing the standard
increases high prices by a larger proposition than low prices, thus tilting the distribution
of relative prices toward high prices. In contrast, the tax induces all plants to spend the
same proportion in abatement relative to their input in production. Thus, prices of all
varieties increase by the same proportion under the tax, leaving the relative price between
any two plants unchanged.
The standard can create higher or lower upward pressure on the price index, depending
on the extent of productivity dispersion. When productivity dispersion is suﬃciently small,
i.e., when δ i ss m a l l ,t h et w on e wf o r c e sa b o v eo nt h ep r i c ei n d e xc r e a t e db yt h es t a n d a r d
are small. In this case, the economy is close to the one with homogeneous plants, in
which the standard has lower upward pressure on the price index than the tax. When
productivity dispersion is suﬃciently high, the two new forces above on the price index
dominate the force in the economy with homogeneous plants. In this case, the standard
has higher upward pressure on the price index than the tax.
Diﬀerences between the two policies’ pressure on the price index translate into dif-
ferences in the quantity of the dirty-goods composite which, in turn, aﬀect the welfare
ranking of the two policies. With the utility function (31), the equilibrium price is ﬁxed
as p = v(M) by the target on aggregate emission. Any upward pressure on the price index
must be absorbed by a fall in output of the dirty-goods composite in order to restore the
equilibrium. Thus, when productivity dispersion is small, the standard induces a higher
quantity of the dirty-goods composite than the tax does. If the monopoly power is also
suﬃciently high, i.e., if ε is suﬃciently small, this higher quantity of dirty goods dominates
the lower quantity of the clean good, and so welfare is higher under the standard than un-
der the tax. On the other hand, if productivity dispersion is suﬃciently high, the standard
induces a much lower quantity of the dirty goods than the tax does. In this case, the tax
dominates the standard in welfare for all ε ≥ 1. This welfare ranking is stated as part (ii)
of Proposition 6.15
15Note that the eﬀectiveness of the abatement technology, 1/γ, also plays a role since the critical levels
ε0 and δ0 in Proposition 6 depend on γ. In the limit γ → 0, even a tiny amount of input in abatement
can reduce emission to zero. In this case, the two policies are equivalent. In the opposite limit γ →∞ ,
the abatement is not eﬀective at all, and the model approaches the baseline model where the tax induces
higher welfare than the standard.
24Let us turn to the remaining parts of Proposition 6. Part (iii) is easy to understand.
First, for utility to be higher under the standard than under the tax, the standard must
generate less pressure on the price index of the dirty-goods composite, in which case the
composite decreases by less under the standard than under the tax. Second, since pro-
ductivity is lower under the standard than under the tax, the input in the dirty-goods
sector must be higher under the standard in order to produce a higher composite of the
dirty goods than under the tax. Third, with (3), abatement is proportional to the input
in production. Thus, a higher input in the production of the dirty-goods composite also
calls for a higher level of abatement. Finally, when the input in the dirty-goods sector is
higher under the standard, the input in the clean-good sector is lower, which contributes
to lower consumption of the clean good under the standard than under the tax.
Finally, part (iv) of Proposition 6 describes the optimal emission target, i.e., the target
that maximizes the representative household’s utility. With (31), the optimal level of c is
proportional to vQ.S i n c evQ depends on M only through the term Mv(1+γ)/γ,s od o e st h e
utility level. The optimal target maximizes this term regardless of which policy is used to
implement the target. This result implies that parts (i) - (iii) of Proposition 6 continue to
hold when the emission target is set to the optimal level under each policy.
5R o b u s t n e s s o f t h e R e s u l t s
For Proposition 6, we used the particular distribution function of productivity, (30), and
the utility function, (31). These functional forms enabled us to obtain explicit solutions
of equilibrium quantities of goods, input and abatement. However, the results hold more
generally. We illustrate this robustness in this section.
5.1 The utility function
Consider ﬁrst the following generalization of the utility function:
u(c,Q,M)={αc
ρ +( 1− α)[v(M)Q]
ρ}
1/ρ , α,ρ ∈ [0,1], v>0,a n dv
0 < 0.
The restriction ρ ≥ 0 is imposed to satisfy Assumption 1. The case ρ =1corresponds to
(31), where the clean good and the dirty-goods composite are perfect substitutes. The case
ρ =0is also analytically tractable and the results are the same as in Proposition 6 after
25am o d i ﬁcation of ε0.F o ra n yρ ∈ [0,1), the relative price of the dirty-goods composite to
the clean good is endogenous, in contrast to the case ρ =1where the price is ﬁxed by the
emission target. We use numerical examples to illustrate the results for ρ ∈ (0,1).L e t
v(M)=M−κ and ﬁx some of the parameters as follows:
α =0 .6,γ=0 .2,b =3 ,w=1 ,x =l n ( 1− δ), κ =0 .5
The chosen value x implies that the mean of ex is 1 and the variance is δ2
1−2δ.W ee x p l o r e
diﬀerent values of (δ,ε,ρ).F o r e a c h ρ ∈ [0,1],w eﬁnd the region of (δ,ε) in which the
standard yields higher welfare than the tax.















feasible δ and ε
Figure 1. The region of (δ,ε) in which the standard dominates the tax
F i g u r e1d e p i c t st w os e t so fc u r v e si nt h e(δ,ε) plane. One is the curve below which
the values of (δ,ε) are feasible. The other is the curve along which the standard and the
tax yield the same level of welfare, and this curve is drawn for three values of ρ, 0.1, 0.5
and 0.8. The standard yields higher welfare than the tax if and only if the values of (δ,ε)
lie below this curve. For all three values of ρ, the standard dominates the tax in welfare
if and only if δ and ε are small. This result is consistent with Proposition 6. In addition,
when the elasticity of substitution between the clean good and the dirty-goods composite
increases, i.e., when ρ increases, the curve moves slightly outward for middle values of δ,
26but inward for very small values of δ. That is, the more substitutable the clean good and
dirty goods are, the more likely the standard dominates if there is some market power (and
if δ is large enough).
5.2 The distribution function of productivity
Now let us return to the utility function (31) but consider a diﬀerent distribution of pro-











This distribution is Weibull if δ>0 and Frechet if δ<0. We normalize z =0to
simplify the algebra. The mean of productivity z is β
−δΓ(1 + δ),a n dt h ev a r i a n c eo fz
is β
−2δ £
Γ(1 + 2δ) − [Γ(1 + δ)]
2¤
,w h e r eΓ is the gamma function. If we ﬁx the mean of z





. Since this variance is
increasing in |δ|, we refer to |δ| as a measure of productivity dispersion among the plants.
We restrict δ>−1/2 for the variance to be bounded and restrict δ>− 1
ε(γ+1) for λ (deﬁned
in (29)) to exist.
With the above distribution function, we can compute the average productivity under
the two policies, respectively, as
φτ = β
−δ [Γ(1 + δ(ε − 1))]
1
ε−1 , φs =
β
−δ [Γ(1 + δ(γ +1 )( ε − 1))]
ε
ε−1
Γ(1 + δ(ε(γ +1 )− 1))
.
The term λ deﬁned in (29) is
λ =
Γ(1 + δ(γ +1 )( ε − 1))[Γ(1 + δε(γ + 1))]
γ
[Γ(1 + δ(ε(γ +1 )− 1))]
γ+1 .










The condition (34) depends only on four parameters: γ, δ, ε, and β.W et a k eγ =0 .2
as in the previous subsection and choose β to normalize the mean of the productivity,
β
−δΓ(1 + δ),t o1. The numerical results are depicted in Figure 2, where the left panel is
for the Frechet distribution and the right panel for the Weibull distribution. The curve
27labeled “tax-standard equivalent line” contains the combinations of δ and ε with which
the two policies yield the same welfare. In the region below this line, the standard yields
higher welfare than the tax. It is clear that this region is non-empty for both the Frechet
and the Weibull distribution. Thus, the standard yields higher welfare than the tax if and
only if productivity dispersion is small (i.e., if |δ| small) and the monopoly power is strong
(i.e., if ε is small). Therefore, the main qualitative result in Proposition 6 also holds under
the distribution function (33).
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Frechet distribution Weibull distribution
Figure 2. The region of (δ,ε) in which the standard dominates the tax
6C o n c l u s i o n
When a society wants to control aggregate emission under a certain target level, is it more
desirable to impose a tax or a regulatory standard on emission? To answer this question,
we explore a model where plants are heterogeneous in productivity and monopolistically
competitive in the production of a set of varieties of (dirty-) goods whose by-product is
emission. The main result is that the standard yields higher welfare than the tax if and
only if productivity dispersion is small and the monopoly power in the dirty-goods sector is
strong. In the process of obtaining this result, we ﬁnd that, if the plants have no access to
an abatement technology, then the tax dominates the standard unambiguously. When the
plants do have access to an abatement technology, there can be less price distortion under
the standard than under the tax, in which case the standard can yield higher welfare.
28Our results illustrate the importance of productivity dispersion and its interaction with
abatement choices in designing environmental policies. They demonstrate when and why a
non-market instrument such as the regulatory standard can be better than a market-based
instrument, such as an emission tax, for achieving an emission target. Both the focus
on productivity dispersion and the assumption of a ﬁxed emission target deviate from
the price-versus-quantity literature in environmental economics. The latter addresses the
question whether it is more desirable to let the price or the aggregate quantity of emission to
ﬂuctuate when there is uncertainty in the marginal cost and beneﬁt of emission reduction.
There are many directions in which one can explore further the importance of produc-
tivity dispersion for environmental policies. For example, with productivity dispersion, the
two policies considered in this paper have diﬀerent eﬀects on plants’ exit and entry. It is
interesting to examine the dynamic eﬀects of these policies. Another exercise is to calibrate
a dynamic model and calculate the cost of reaching an environmental target. Li and Sun
(2009) have made an attempt on such quantitative exercises.
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A Proofs of Lemma 3 and Proposition 4












For any given ¯ M, the left-hand side of the above equation is independent of τ and the right-
hand side is an increasing function of τ. Thus, there exists a unique level of τ, denoted
τ( ¯ M), that solves the above equation. With this level of the tax, other equilibrium variables
are uniquely determined as in the main text. Moreover, the target ¯ M is binding if and
only if τ( ¯ M) > 0. The latter requirement is equivalent to the condition that the left-hand
side of the above equation is strictly greater than P(0,φ(x)). Since the left-hand side of
the above equation is a strictly decreasing function of ¯ M (see Assumption 1), the target is
binding if and only if ¯ M<M max.I ti se a s yt os e et h a tτ0( ¯ M) < 0 and τ(Mmax)=0 .















where φ = φ(ln(b/s)). For any given ¯ M, the assumption on qR imposed in Lemma 3
ensures that the left-hand side of the above equation is a strictly increasing function of φ
and reaches 0 at φ =0 . There is a unique level of φ, denoted φs( ¯ M), that solves the above
equation. The implied standard can be calculated from φs( ¯ M)=φ(ln(b/s( ¯ M))) and other
equilibrium variables can be uniquely determined as in the main text. Moreover, the target
¯ M is binding iﬀ ln(b/s( ¯ M)) >x , i.e., iﬀ φs( ¯ M) <φ (x). This requirement is equivalent
to ¯ M<M max. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that φ
0
s( ¯ M) > 0 and φs(Mmax)=φ(x).
Hence, s0( ¯ M) > 0 and s(Mmax)=be−x. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
Now we prove Proposition 4 by verifying statements (i)-(iii) in the proposition. State-
ment (i) is evident, since L = ¯ M/b and c = w(1 − L) under both policies. For statement
(ii), the proof of Lemma 3 has already established x0τ = x < ln(b/s)=x0s for any binding
target. Because φ(x0) deﬁned by (12) is a strictly decreasing function of x0,t h e nφτ >φ s.
Since Q = φ ¯ M/b,t h e nQτ >Q s.R e c a l l t h a t P = R(c,Q,M) and that R(c,Q,M) is a
30strictly decreasing function of Q.W eh a v ePτ = R(c,Qτ, ¯ M) <R (c,Qs, ¯ M)=Ps.F i n a l l y ,
uτ = u(c,Qτ, ¯ M) >u (c,Qs, ¯ M)=us.Q E D
B Proofs of Lemma 5 and Proposition 7
For Lemma 5, we only derive the formulas for the tax and prove that there exists a unique
equilibrium. The derivation and the proof for the standard are similar and, hence, are
omitted. Under the tax, we substitute q(x) from (19) into (1) to compute Q and aggregate
l(x) from (17) to compute L, which yields φ = Q/L = φ(x),w h e r eφ(.) is the function
deﬁned by (12). Aggregating m(x) in (19), we have M = b( τb
γw)
−1
γ+1L. Inverting this result
yields τ as the function of (L,M) in (24). Substituting p(x) from (19) into (7), we obtain
P = εk
(ε−1)φ,w h e r ek is a function of τ given by (18). Substituting τ,w eo b t a i n





,( 3 5 )
and, hence, P is as in (24). Aggregating a(x) in (16) and substituting τ from (24), we
obtain A as in (25). Since total input in the dirty-goods sector is (L+A), consumption of
the clean good is c = w(1 − L − A). Substituting A,w eo b t a i nc as in (25). The quantity
Q is determined by (6). Proving that there exists a unique equilibrium amounts to proving










,( 3 6 )
where c(Q) is given by (25). Under Assumption 1, the left-hand side of (36) is a strictly
decreasing function of Q, while the right-hand side is a strictly increasing function of Q.
With these features, it is easy to prove that there is a unique solution for Q to (36). This
completes the proof of Lemma 5.
For Proposition 7, we assume that the measure of plants is one without loss of generality.
When all plants have the same productivity, l(x)=L, a(x)=A, q(x)=Q,a n dm(x)=M.
It is evident that φs = φτ = ex and λ =1 . Substituting the pricing formulas in (24) and











31where σ = γ +1under the tax and σ =1under the standard. Under both policies,







and φ = ex in the above equation. Denote the solution to the above
equation as Q(σ).I t i s c l e a r t h a t Q0(σ) < 0.T h u s , Qs >Q τ. From (25), (28) and
L = Q/φ, it is clear that Ls >L τ, As >A τ,a n dcs <c τ. Express the utility level as
ˆ u(σ) ≡ u(c(σ),Q(σ),M). Then, us >u τ iﬀ ˆ u(1) > ˆ u(γ +1 ) .I t c a n b e v e r i ﬁed that
ˆ u0(σ) < 0 iﬀ σ>(γ +1)(ε−1)/ε.I f1 ≥ (γ +1)(ε−1)/ε, i.e., if ε ≤ 1+1
γ,t h e nˆ u0(σ) < 0
for all σ>1.I nt h i sc a s e ,uτ =ˆ u(γ +1 )< ˆ u(1) = us. On the other hand, if ε →∞ ,t h e n
ˆ u0(σ) > 0 for all σ<γ+1 . In this case, uτ =ˆ u(γ +1 )> ˆ u(1) = us.Q E D
C Proof of Proposition 6
Using (30), we compute the average productivity as
φ =
(
[1 − δ(ε − 1)]
−1




ε−1 ex, with the standard. (37)
The statement φs <φ τ is true if and only if
ε
ε − 1
ln[1 − δ(ε − 1)(γ +1 ) ]− ln[1 + δ − δε(γ +1 ) ]−
1
ε − 1
ln[1 − δ(ε − 1)] > 0.
Temporarily denote the left-hand side as LHS(δ).N o t et h a tLHS(0) = 0 and LHS( 1
ε(γ+1)) >
0.A l s o ,LHS0(δ) has the same sign as the following expression:
δεγ(γ +1 )
[1 − δ(ε − 1)(γ +1 ) ][ 1+δ − δε(γ +1 ) ]
+
1
[1 − δ(ε − 1)]
.
Thus, LHS0(δ) > 0.F o ra l lδ>0, LHS(δ) >L HS (0) = 0.
With the utility function (31), it is clear that Ps = Pτ = v(M). For part (i) of the






(ε−1)v(M)(γ +1 ) ,w i t h t h e t a x
εw
(ε−1)v(M), with the standard.
It is evident that Q/(L + A) is higher under the tax than under the standard.
For other parts of the proposition, we substitute G from (30) into (29) to compute
λ =
[1 + δ − δε(γ +1 ) ]
γ+1
[1 − δε(γ +1 ) ]
γ [1 − δ(ε − 1)(γ +1 ) ]
(> 1).( 3 8 )
32For part (ii), we use (32) to solve for L, A and c. Substituting (c,Q) and λ into (31), we




γ+1 . Write the latter condition equivalently as follows:
1
ε−1 ln[1 − δ(ε − 1)] +
γ
γ+1 ln[1 − δε(γ +1 ) ]
−
εγ+1
(ε−1)(γ+1) ln[1 − δ(ε − 1)(γ +1 ) ]+l n ( γ +1 )−
γ
γ+1 ln(εγ +1 ) > 0.
Temporarily denote the left-hand side as LHS(δ). It is clear that LHS( 1
ε(γ+1))=−∞.





[1 − δ(ε − 1)][1 − δ(ε − 1)(γ +1 ) ][ 1− δε(γ +1 ) ]
< 0.
If ε ≥ ε0,t h e nLHS(δ) <L H S (0) ≤ 0, in which case us <u τ for all δ ∈ (0,¯ δ).I fε<ε 0,
then LHS(0) > 0, in which case there exists δ0 ∈ (0,¯ δ) such that us >u τ iﬀ δ<δ 0.




γ+1 .B e c a u s eε>1,t h e nus >u τ implies
Qs >Q τ. Similarly, since L = Q/φ and φτ >φ s,t h e nQs >Q τ implies Ls >L τ.T o
compare the aggregate level of abatement and consumption of the clean good under the















¢γ λ − 1
¤




¢γ λ under the standard. Since λ>1,t h e
inequality Ls >L τ is suﬃcient for As >A τ and cs <c τ.
For part (iv), we can substitute equilibrium values of (c,Q) into the utility function to
verify that u(c + v(M)Q) depends on M entirely through the term M[v(M)](1+γ)/γ and is
increasing in this term. Then, part (iv) is evident. QED
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